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In a major decision handed down last term (International Union [UAW] versus Johnson Controls, Inc.), the
Supreme Court ruled that employment practices excluding fertile or pregnant women from the workplace
because of alleged concerns for fetal health constitute illegal sex discrimination. We analyze the three
opinions in the case and explain why the decision was an essential first step to promoting reproductive and
developmental health in the workplace. Continued progress toward eliminating or reducing reproductive
occupational risks will require comprehensive legal strategies involving private lawsuits, governmental
regulation and enforcement actions, and new legislation designed to preserve the existing rights of workers
and to obtain new and additional protections. Finally, we caution that, in designing such strategies, it will be
important to avoid solutions that either shift responsibility forreproductive health to workers, ratherthan to
employers, or that undermine other important legal rights.
Introduction
On March 20,1991, the Supreme Court held in Inter-
national Union (UAW) versus Johnson Controls, Inc. (1)
that "fetal protection policies," under which employers
have excluded fertile or pregnant women from hazardous
work sites allegedly to protect an actual orpotential fetus,
constituted sex discrimination. As such, the Court said,
theserules wereinvalid underTitleVII ofthe Civil Rights
Act because the employer could not prove that a woman's
fertility or pregnancy interfered with her ability to per-
form essential work assignments. The Court specifically
rejected the employer's argument that it was entitled to
bar all fertile women to achieve even such a desirable goal
as avoiding fetal risk. Instead, the Court held that
employers could not avoid their obligation to maintain
acceptableworkplace conditionsbydiscriminatingagainst
women workers. The plain import of the decision is that
employers must protect against fetal harm and employ
women on a nondiscriminatory basis.
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The initial response in the labor and women's rights
communities to the Supreme Court's decision was one of
general jubilation (2-4). However, there were some who,
while recognizing the importance ofthe case in establish-
ingequal employment opportunity forwomen, voiced con-
cern that the Court had not adequately addressed the
underlying health issues. The result of this omission, the
criticsargued,isthattheopiniondoesnotprotectanyone's
health, but simply sanctions equal exposure ofwomen and
men to working conditions dangerous to their health and
the health ofany future offspring (5).
SuchexplicitcriticismoftheCourt's opinionandimplicit
criticism of the coalition of labor, women's rights, and
public health advocates that litigated the case and articu-
lated the approach ultimately adopted by the Court
reflects impatience with the use ofthe courts as part of-
but certainly not all of-any broad, long-term strategy
toward greater protection ofindividuals. Such impatience
is understandable but does not fully accountforthe struc-
ture of the legal system through which changes occur.
Legal strategies necessarily reflect the limitations ofthe
legal system. That system has a tendency to deal with
societal problems in an incremental, subdividedway that
can be frustrating to those seeking an immediate, global
answer. To work within that system, litigants are con-
strained to proceed in a measured fashion in structuring
their lawsuits and often cannot rely on litigation alone to
reach the ultimate goal.
Itis, forexample, ordinarilynotpossible tocombinein a
single lawsuit all aspects of such complex societal prob-6CLAUSS ET AL.
lems as assuring equal employment opportunity and
reproductive health in the workplace. Courts decide only
thelegal questionspresentedbytheprecise disputebefore
themanddonotgobeyondthoselegal questions toexpress
viewsondifferentsocietalissuesnotsquarelyraisedbythe
particularcasesunderconsideration. Moreover,courts are
usually willing to resolve in a single lawsuit only those
aspects ofthe problem addressed under a particular stat-
ute or cause of action; workplace gender equality and
workplace safety, for example, are covered by separate
Federal statutes and cannotusuallybelitigatedinasingle
lawsuit. Also, our complicated legal system divides
adjudication between state and Federal courts and
between agencies and courts; consequently, theories that
depend upon state and Federal statutes (such as state and
Federal equal employment statutes) or on court-enforced
and agency-enforced statutes (such as equal employment
and occupationalhealthandsafetystatutes) oftenmustbe
litigated separately. Additionally, some statutes (such as
the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act) do not
give individuals the right to go to court to assert rights.
Instead, under those statutes, the government acts as the
enforcer of those rights only if it so chooses, and propo-
nents of progressive actions therefore must persuade
governmentofficials togoforward, ataskreallymoreakin
to lobbying than to litigation.
As aconsequence oftheselegallimitations, UAWversus
Johnson Controls and the limited issue it decided, was
always intended as the first, not the last, in a series of
changes in employer and governmental policies ultimately
necessarytoprotectreproductivehealthintheworkplace.
The statute in question in UAWversus Johnson Controls
wasTitleVII ofthe1964CivilRightsAct(6), astatutethat
only assures sexual equality and does not otherwise
address health issues. Thus, the lawyers in the case could
not have raised any health issues directly, although facts
concerning the impact oflead on reproductive health and
health generally were central to showing that gender-
based discrimination was occurring.
The employers' obligation to maintain aworkplace free
from recognized hazards is set out in the Occupational
SafetyandHealthAct[OSHAct(7)], andonlytheDepart-
ment of Labor can bring suit for any breach of that
obligation. Nor can lawyers generally bring a personal
injury or tort suit against employers forpotential injuries
resulting from workplace exposures. In the first place,
before anysuch suit could bebrought, therewould have to
be an actualinjury, notjustthepotentialforinjury. In the
second place, mostworker compensation statutes bar tort
suitsbyemployees. Forallthesereasons, questions specif-
ically concerning appropriate employer protections of
reproductive health were not directly at issue in UAW
versus Johnson Controls.
Yet, the issue decided in UAWversus Johnson Controls
was an essential first step to the fair resolution of the
occupational safety and health issues and corporate
responsibility questions concerning reproductive health
generally. Had the Court approved exclusion of women
fromworkplacesentirelybecauseofreproductivedangers,
the resultwould have been characterized byemployers as
a total solution to the issue of workplace reproductive
hazards.Themajorcosttowomen's economic securityand
the economic security of their families would then have
received no weight in corporate decision making, and any
attempt to protect both reproductive health and economic
security and equality would have been permanently stal-
led.Atthe sametime, largeroccupational health concerns
caused by toxics such as lead would have been minimized
by industry once fetal injury questions were out of the
picture. Thus, the UAW versus Johnson Controls litiga-
tion,while nottheultimate solution toreproductive health
in theworkplace, was a necessarybuildingblock in reach-
ing that goal. Now that it is completed, the task becomes
one ofdefining and pursuing appropriate legal and policy
strategies toward assuring women and men the oppor-
tunity to work without endangering their reproductive
health and the health offuture offspring.
UAWversus Johnson Controls and
Other Title VII Cases
Because OSHA does not give employees or their repre-
sentatives the power to enforce the OSH Act and because
the Department of Labor, after 1980, refused to take an
active role in opposingfetalprotection policies, the efforts
of employee lawyers focused on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act as the only available remedy for affected
women workers. While they succeeded in placing impor-
tant limits on employers' use of fetal protection policies,
none of the court decisions outlawed such policies com-
pletely. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals had ruled that such policies could, in limited
circumstances, be justified as a "business necessity" (8-
10).TheSixthCircuitadoptedanevenstricterrule,requir-
ingemployers to showthatthepolicycouldbe defended as
a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ), which
permits sexdiscrimination in employmentwhen the sex of
the employee is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation" ofthe business (11). The Seventh Circuitwould
have allowed such policies to proliferate because it
required little in the way of a business justification (12).
Onlyone state court,applyingstatelaw,hadheldthatsuch
policies always constitute prohibited sex discrimination
(13).EventheFederalagencychargedwithenforcingTitle
VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), issued a series of confusing and contradictory
guidelines and ultimately refused to invalidate fetal pro-
tection policies absolutely (14,15).
Importance ofthe Issue
Bythetime UAWversusJohnson Controlshadreached
the Supreme Court, the law governing fetal protection
policieswasin a state ofdisarray. Thepolicies hadbecome
widespread in many industries (chemical, petrochemical,
lead battery, paint, rubber, tire, plastics, computer chip
processing). It was estimated that the 15-20 million jobs
involving exposure to known or suspected reproductive
hazards could be closed to women if fetal protection pol-
icies were permitted (16).
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The stakes for women in the outcome of UAW versus
Johnson Controls were thus extraordinarily high. Fetal
protection policies threatened to resegregate the work-
place alonggenderlines, since suchrestrictions weremost
often imposed in traditionally male industries where
wages were high and women were perceived as marginal
workers (17). In contrast, suchpolicieswererarelyapplied
in traditionally female industries where the risk of toxic
exposure was often similar, as, for example, in hospitals,
schools, dry cleaning establishments, beauty salons, and
day care centers (18). Reinforcing such discriminatory
employmentpatternswouldnotonlylimitwomen'semploy-
ment opportunities, but the resulting oversupply of
workers for the traditionally female occupations would be
likely to further depress the wage and benefit levels for
those occupations (19).
Some employers and commentators have attempted to
justify fetal protection policies as necessary to protect
employers from potential ruinous tort liability arising
fromdamages to the offspringofwomenworkers exposed
to toxicants. Because awomanworker's childwould notbe
covered byworker compensation statutes, thiswas said to
represent more significant financial exposure than any
potential health hazards to the adult worker, who, for the
most part, is limited to recovery under the workers com-
pensation system. Reproductive injury to the worker is
often not covered under that system. This rationale was
less than persuasive because the liability potential was
more hypothetical than real and because liability would
also extend to the children ofmale workers.
Other commentators questioned whether such policies
even promoted maternal-fetal health because the policies
caused women to be unemployed or underemployed. The
alternatives most often confronting women workers were
either unemployment, employment in equally hazardous
female occupations, and/or employment in inferior jobs
that provided lowerwages and fewifanybenefits, includ-
ing health insurance. Obviously, none of these options
could be counted on to promote the health of future or
current offspring. Indeed, poverty and the lack of ade-
quateprenatal care are stronglycorrelated with lowbirth
weight and prematurity, the two most common causes of
infant morbidity and mortality in the United States.
Fetal protection policies caused other health problems.
They promoted surgical sterilizations, even where such
procedures were not actively recommended by the
employer, since sterilization was often the only way to
retain needed employment. Such policies ignored the risk
ofharm to children ofmale workers as well as the loss of
reproductivefunctionandsexualcapacityinmaleworkers.
Finally, such policies, by immunizing the employer from
any lawsuit outside the worker compensation system,
encouraged higher levels of toxic exposure for adult
workers, even in situations where it would have been
feasible to significantly reduce these exposure levels. This
is perhaps best illustrated in the lead industry, where
employers proposed an exposure level of 200 ,ug/m3
(rather than the 50 ,ug/m3 level adopted) iffertile women
could be excluded from lead-exposed jobs, arguing that
monitoring employee health would be sufficient to avoid
the most serious adverse health effects of lead exposure
(20).
TheCase
Johnson Controlsjustified itspolicyexcludingallfertile
womenfromproductionjobs,with no automatic agecutoff,
inpartonthe grounds thatits earliervoluntarypolicyhad
been ineffective in excluding women who subsequently
becamepregnant. Thisearlierpolicyprovidedinpertinent
part that the effect of lead on the adult person is well
understood, but when it comes to the effect oflead on an
unborn child, we know alotless. The evidence ofany such
risk is not as clear as the relationship between cigarette
smokingandcancer,butthecompanyfeels anobligation to
informwomenthatthereisariskandtorecommendthatif
they wish to have children the risk is high enough to
recommend not working at ajob in lead exposure. Judge
Posner noted in his dissenting opinion in the Seventh
Circuit that this policy seemed designed more to "allay
concern" than to promote concern (12).Also, atthe time of
this policy, women were not given salary orjob protection
when they wished to transfer out of jobs because of
reproductive risk.
Therecord(whetheritwascompleteornot)showedthat
sixworkers in 4.5years hadpregnancieswhile theirblood
lead levels were, for any period of time, in excess of 30
Rg/100 g. (The record did not show how many women
workers there were or how many became pregnant over
the same time period.) None of the children of the preg-
nantworkerswithelevatedbloodleadlevelswereshownto
have anybehavioral orlearningproblems. (Therewas one
childofawomanworkerwhohadbehavioralproblems, but
the Johnson Controls' doctorwas unable to link the prob-
lems to the mother's blood lead levels.)
The first legal question decided by the Court was
whether the legality of a fetal protection policy is to be
tested under a disparate impact/business necessity anal-
ysis or under a disparate treatment/BFOQ analysis.
UnderbasicTitleVIIprinciples,thelatteranalysisapplies
where an employer policy or decision turns directly upon
gender, while the former applies where the policy has a
neutralbasis,butinpracticeinjures one sexmorethanthe
other. This questionofwhich analysis to applywas critical
because the business necessity defense was not only the
more lenient standard but also required the plaintiff to
bear the burden of persuasion on all questions, whereas
the statutory BFOQ defense places the burden ofpersua-
sion onthe employer. (Thebusiness necessitydefense, but
notthe BFOQprovision,was amendedbythe Civil Rights
Act of1991 (21), so that the distinction between the two is
now less stark than it was at the time UAW versus
Johnson Controls was decided.)
All ninejustices agreed that the fetal protection policy
was intentional sex discrimination that could only be
defended by proof that sex was a bona fide occupational
qualification. Justice Blackmun's opinion made three
important points:
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a) The employer's "ostensibly benign" motive for its
policy is irrelevant in determining whether a policy con-
stitutes sex-based discrimination; "the absence ofamalev-
olent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory
policyinto aneutral policywith adiscriminatoryeffect" (1,
sect. 1203-4).
b) Johnson Controls' policy is facially discriminatory
because it requires only a female employee to produce
proofthat sheis notcapable ofreproducing (1, sect. 1203);
". . . th[e] ... policyis notneutral because it does notapply
to the reproductive capacity of the company's male
employees in the same way as it applies to that of the
females."
(c) After the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA), "in which Congress explicitly provided that, for
purposes ofTitle VII, discrimination 'on the basis ofsex'
includes discrimination 'because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions'" (1,
sect. 1203), employers cannot argue that their fetal pro-
tection policies do not constitute disparate treatment
because they treat all persons "capable of bearing chil-
dren" the same. Congress has defined such policies as sex
based.
Itshould alsobenoted thatthe Courtwasunanimous in
concluding that Johnson Controls was not entitled to
summary judgment even under a more lenient analysis,
since Johnson Controls' policy did not "effectively and
equally protec[t] the offspring of all employees" (1, sect.
1203) and because its claims ofexcess risks and potential
costs were not documented. Of possible significance to
future tort and OSHA cases, Justice White wrote that
the Seventh Circuit "should not have discounted" the
plaintiffs' evidence of male reproductive harm "as 'spec-
ulative'. . .merelybecauseitwasbasedonanimal studies."
AccordingtoWhite,theSupremeCourthas"approvedthe
use ofanimal studies to assess risks ... and OSHA used
animal studies in establishingitslead control regulations"
[White's concurring opinion (1, sect. 1215)].
The majorquestion dividingthe parties inthe Supreme
Court in UAW versus Johnson Controls and separating
the majority from the concurringjustices when the case
was decidedwaswhetherthe BFOQ defense onlyexcused
sexdiscriminationifwomenwereunabletoperformessen-
tial job functions (as the plaintiffs argued), or whether it
couldberead morebroadlytopermit sexdiscriminationin
order to accommodate the employer's concerns forfetuses
(morality) and ruinous costs resulting from threatened
tort liability (as the employer and the United States, as
amicus curiae, maintained).
The five-justice majority in UAWversus Johnson Con-
trols held that a fetal protection policy can exclude or
burden women employees (or any group of women
employees) only if those women are physically unable to
perform thejob. In UAWversus Johnson Controls there
was noquestionthatwomen,whetherpregnant ornot, are
physically able to perform the productionjobs in Johnson
Controls' battery plants.
In reaching this result, the majority stressed the plain
language ofthe statute and the narrowness ofthe BFOQ
defense (previously emphasized by the Court), while not-
ing that "[t]he wording of the BFOQ defense contains
several terms of restriction" (viz., "'certain instances'
where sex discrimination is 'reasonably necessary' to the
'normal operation' ofthe 'particular' business' ") and that
"the mosttellingterm is 'occupational'; this indicates that
these objective, verifiable requirements must concernjob-
related skills and aptitudes" (1, sect. 1204). "Bymodifying
'qualification' with 'occupational,' Congress narrowed the
term to qualifications that affect an employee's ability to
do thejob" (1, sect. 1205).
In so deciding, the majority opinion rejected the
employer's argument that the fetal protection policy fell
within the so-called safety exception to the BFOQ recog-
nized bythe CourtinDothard versusRawlinson (22) and
Western Air Lines, Inc. versus Criswell (23). In those
cases, the courtheld thata) the "safety concernswere not
independent of the individual's [physical] ability to per-
form the assigned tasks" (1, sect. 1205) and b) the third
parties involved (passengers and prison inmates) "were
indispensable to the particular business at issue" (1, sect.
1205). According to the majority, the expansion of the
BFOQ defense to include cost and safety concerns -
unrelated to job performancc would be inconsistent with
the "essence of the business" test established in earlier
opinionsoftheCourt(1, sect.1205-1206). Forexample,part
ofthe"essence ofthebusiness"ofairtravelisinsuringthe
safety of passengers. It could not be similarly concluded
thatinsuringthe safetyoffetuses is part ofthe "essence"
ofthe business ofmanufacturing batteries.
Further, the Court noted that a "fetal-protection"
exceptionwould contradicttheplainlanguage ofthePDA,
which provides that "women affected by pregnancy ... or
relatedmedical conditions shallbe treated the sameforall
employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affectedbutsimilarintheirabilityorinabilitytowork" (1,
sect. 1206). Similarly, the legislative history of the PDA
made it clear that employers could notrequire a pregnant
woman to stopworking at anytime during her pregnancy
unless she was unable to do her work, even though there
was evidence before Congress that employment late in
pregnancy often poses risks (1, sect. 1207).
Justice White, writing for himself and two other jus-
tices, would have held that a BFOQ defense is available,
baseduponfetalprotectionconcerns,if"reasonablyneces-
saryto avoid substantial tortliability" (1, sect. 1210). Even
under his analysis, however, Johnson Controls' exclusion-
ary policy, and, in all probability, almost any other such
policy, would be invalid.
Under Justice White's approach, an employer could
establish a BFOQ if he could show that the level of risk
avoidance embraced by its fetal protection policy (in this
case, zero risk because ofthe rule's coverage ofall fertile
women)isreasonablynecessarytothe"normaloperation"
of the particular business. In other words, Justice White
also relies on plain language, but he would emphasize the
words"normaloperation" and notthewords"occupational
qualification" (1, sect. 1213-1215).
According to Justice White, Johnson Controls had not
validateditspolicyunderthe"normaloperation"language
because a) "the fetal protection policy insists on a risk-
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avoidance level substantially higher than other risk levels
tolerated by Johnson Controls such as risks to employees
and consumers" (1, sect. 1215), and b) the company pre-
viously operated without an exclusionary policy with no
apparent difficulty or extraordinary costs (1, sect. 1215).
White also criticized the breadth of Johnson Controls'
fetal protection policy, as well as the court's failure to
consider properly plaintiffs' evidence ofharm to offspring
caused by lead exposure in males (1, sect. 1215). Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion was closer in reasoning to the
majority's, except that he would not entirely foreclose a
defense based on substantial cost (1, sect. 1216).
Impact of UAW versus Johnson
Controls on Reproductive and
Developmental Health
The UAW versus Johnson Controls decision restored
the issue of workplace reproductive and developmental
health to the national agenda, but the focus of future
activities will necessarily shift. In particular, the Court's
opinion refocuses attention on the next step: the laws and
procedures specifically intended to address workplace
safety issues. Although the OSH Act does not prohibit a
companyfrom shuttingdown ahazardous occupation (and
indeed mayrequire it), it was nevermeantto authorize the
exclusion or discharge of a significant segment of the
workforce as a means of removing recognized workplace
hazards. This much is clear from both the Act's plain
language and its broad purposes. Section 5(a)(1) gives the
employer only one method, short of a shutdown, for
addressing recognized risks, viz., "furnish[ing] to each of
his employees employment and a place ofemployment ...
free from recognized hazards" [emphasis added (7)].
Plainly, excluding or discharging fertile women does not
provide them "employment or a place of employment ...
free from recognized hazards" (7). Nor are such actions
consistentwiththe stated purposes oftheOSHAct. These
purposes include "assur[ing] so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
workingconditions," "preserv[ing] our humanresources,"
"encouraging employers ... in their efforts to reduce the
number ofoccupational safety and health hazards at their
places ofemployment," and "stimulat[ing] employers and
employees to institute new and to perfect existing pro-
grams for providing safe and healthful working condi-
tions" (7). All of these purposes contemplate the full and
healthy participation of men and women in the workplace,
not their exclusion.
Earlier efforts to enforce these provisions of OSHA-
both to bar sex-based exclusions and to enforceworkplace
safety and health -had notbeen successful. Inparticular,
women workers at the American Cyanamid Company
plant inWillow Island, WestVirginia, and their union, the
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers (OCAW), filed com-
plaints with OSHA in 1979 asserting that the company's
"fetal protection" policy, which had caused five women to
submit to surgical sterilization to protect theirjob rights,
violated the Act.* After an investigation, the Department
of Labor issued a citation charging that American
Cyanamid had violated Section 5(a)(1) ofthe Act (the so-
called "general duty clause") by maintaining a policy that
made sterilization a condition ofemployment and thus an
employment "hazard."
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion (OSHRC) vacated the citation on the ground that the
company's fetal protection policy did not create a "hazard
of employment" (24). This decision was affirmed by the
Court ofAppeals forthe D.C. Circuit (25) in an opinion by
Judge Robert Bork that has been the subject of serious
criticisms. A change of administration occurred between
the timetheinitial OSHAcomplaintwas filed andthetime
the casewentto the appellate court. (The citation and suit
were filed during the Carter administration, but the deci-
sions ofOSHRC and the courtofappeals occurred during
the Reagan administration.) Interestingly, the Labor
Departmentrefused to defend the original Section 5(a)(1)
citation against American Cyanamid in the D.C. Court of
Appeals. The Department of Labor has issued no addi-
tional citations againstcompanies instituting ormaintain-
ing fetal protection policies.
Other courts might well have rejected Judge Bork's
conclusions in OCAW versus American Cyanamid, but
only the U.S. Department of Labor could have pressed
such a case and obtained favorable decisions in other
courts by continuing to cite employers for implementing
fetal protection policies. The Department's d2cision not to
continuetochallengetheimplementationandmaintenance
of fetal protection policies under OSHA was never
explained. However,thedecisionwassomewhatsurprising
in view of the Department's interpretation of Section
6(b)(5) of the OSH Act, which sets out the Secretary's
responsibility for promulgating health standards and
which, using the same kind ofinclusive language as Sec-
tion 5(a)(1), directs that the Secretary "in promulgating
standards dealing with toxic materials . .. , shall set the
standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer material impair-
mentofhealth orfunctional capacityevenifsuchemployee
hasregularexposuretothehazard ...fortheperiod ofhis
working life" (7).
The Secretary of Labor relied on this language in
promulgating the 1978 Lead Standard, which rejected an
industry proposal to exclude fertile women from jobs
involving exposure to lead and which adopted instead a
standard that, although not completely risk-free, reason-
ablyassuredreproductiveanddevelopmental healthbased
ontheinformation available atthe time (26). Moreover, the
Department's decisionintheLeadStandardnottoauthor-
ize a less protective standard based on the exclusion of
*The women represented by the ACLU Women's Rights Project and
the union also filed alawsuitin Federal court challenging the company's
policy as sex discrimination and asserting tort claims based on fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional harm, and violation of the right to
privacy. That case was settled.
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fertile women was specifically upheld bythe D.C. Court of
Appeals (27).
The critical point is this: whatever the Department of
Labor's reason fornotchallengingfetal protectionpolicies
under the OSH Act, the underlying premise of OCAW
versus American Cyanamid, that fertile women could be
excluded in order to achieve safety objectives, is no longer
viable after UAW versus Johnson Controls. Given this
ruling, one might have expected the business community
toradicallyreformits approach toreproductive and devel-
opmental health hazards in theworkplace. While this may
yet happen, the initial reported response of the business
community has not been encouraging. This suggests that
amajorenforcementinitiativewillbeneededifwomen and
men are to enjoy adequate workplace protection for
reproductive anddevelopmentalhealth andifwomenareto
now have equal access to industrialjobs.
After UAWversus Johnson Controls:
New Legal Strategies for the Future
Four primary concerns have been raised in the wake of
UAW versus Johnson Controls. First, there are appar-
ently some employers who believe that Title VII, as inter-
preted by UAW versus Johnson Controls, forbids
employers from absolutely excluding fertile women from
developmental-riskjobs,butnotfromdiscouragingwomen
(and not men) from taking such jobs. Second, some busi-
nesses that had fetal protection policies do not seem to
have implemented anywork practices or engineering con-
trols thatwouldmitigate orremove the hazard recognized
by the policy, but rather have simply sought waivers from
any fertile women who insist on taking jobs previously
covered by an exclusionary policy. Third, there is growing
evidence of a reverse Johnson Controls policy, where
employers are a) refusing accommodations that they had
previouslyextended towomenwhobecamepregnantwhile
workingwithtoxic substances, includingtemporary trans-
fers, disability leaves (either with or without reduced pay
and/or benefits), or leaves without pay or b) contesting
claims for unemployment insurance where pregnant
women have quit suchjobs because ofthe unavailability of
any accommodations, all on the grounds that pregnant
women cannot be prohibited from performing such work.
Fourth, the entire fetal protection policy debate emphas-
izes the need for a remedy that will both compensate
employees for the loss of their reproductive and sexual
function (which currently does not exist) and will induce
the employer to remove the workplace hazards that result
in such losses. Moreover, as the California decision in Bell
versus Macys, Inc. (28) makes clear, there is the addi-
tional need for damages where the workplace exposure or
other negligent action by the employer causes palpable
injury that is not now compensable.
What litigators need now is a comprehensive set of
strategies for addressing these responses and for secur-
ing bothjob access and the implementation ofresponsible
programs for assuring the reproductive and developmen-
tal health of both men and women employees. These
strategies can be examined under four specific employ-
ment objectives: a) job access, b) securing reproductive
and developmental health protection in the workplace, c)
makingaccommodationsforwomenandmenwhochoosenot
to continue working injobs that pose a threat to reproduc-
tion; and d) compensatingemployees (andtheirchildren) for
any injury to reproductive and developmental health and
deterringworkplace practices that result in such injuries.
These strategies include making better use of existing
laws and, in some cases, seeking legislative change.
Assuring Job Access to Women Employees
After the decison in UAW versus Johnson Controls,
some employers have claimed that, while the Court's deci-
sion made it unlawful to exclude or terminate fertile
women from employment, it did not make it unlawful for
employers to discourage fertile women from taking jobs
involving exposure to toxic substances. One company sug-
gested amultistep program, with recommended interven-
tions atthetimeofapplication, duringthepre-employment
physical, and later, at the bidding and job transfer stage.
Atthe time ofapplication, each applicantwould receive an
applicationformthatwould containthefollowingnotation:
"Theuse ofleadin ourmanufacturingoperations creates a
lead absorption risk for employees. That risk varies
throughout the plant.... Scientific and medical evidence
indicates that a woman capable of bearing children can
cause damagetothebrain ofherunborn child ifsheworks
aroundleadwithleadlevelshigherthanthoseinherhome.
The Company strongly recommends that women ofchild-
bearing capacity not seekjobs ...."
If, despite this warning, a fertile woman submits a job
application and is otherwise selected for employment, she
would thenbegiven"additionalcounseling," eitherpriorto
or as part ofthepre-employmentmedical examination, "to
assure that [she] underst[ood] therisksinvolvedwithlead
exposure ... and the possible resulting body burden of
lead upon a child which [might] be conceived." The com-
pany's physician would recommend against such employ-
ment and, ifthe woman still insisted on thejob, she would
be required to sign a statement, -"acknowledging" her
"acceptance of responsibility for the risks involved as a
condition ofemployment" (emphasis added).
Similarly, if a fertile woman seeks to transfer to a job
involving toxic exposures, she would be required to
undergo the same counseling and would be required to
sign the same statement accepting responsibility for her
decision as a condition of continued employment. In addi-
tion, she and all other fertile women who had such jobs
would be required to attend yearly counseling.
Obviously, there is nothing "neutral" about this pro-
posed program. It singles outfertilewomen, but notfertile
men, for specialized notice and counseling thatis explicitly
designed to discourage them from accepting the veryjobs
that the Supreme Court ruled could not be closed to them
under the company's fetal protection policy. The notion
that this modified fetal protection policy does not also
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is flatly contra-
dicted by the Supreme Court's decision in UAW versu,ts
Joh/n,son Controls. TitleVII does notonlymakeitunlawful
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"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge anyindividual ...
because of ... sex," it also, by its very terms, makes it
unlawful"otherwise todiscriminateagainstanyindividual
...because of... sex" (6).As notedbytheSupreme Court,
this language was "intended to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women" (29).
Congress wanted "to guarantee women the basic right to
participate fully and equally in the workforce" (30).
Inthisconnection,thecourtshavenothesitatedtofinda
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act where
employers haveimposed additional burdens onwomen and
minorities during the application process. For example,
King versus Trans WorldAirlines, Inc. (31) held that the
employer could not have two interview policies for job
applicants: oneforwomen, where itasked questions about
pregnancy, childbearing, legitimacy ofchildren, and child
care, and another for men, where it asked no comparable
questions. Also, EEOC versus Metal Service Co. (32)
found aviolation ofTitle VII where black applicants were
required to undergo a burdensome application process
through the statejob service, while white applicants were
being hired through word-of-mouth recruitment.
There is no question that the modified fetal protection
policy described above would burden employment oppor-
tunities for women; indeed, it was designed to have just
that effect. First, women (but not men) are required to
answer questions about extremely private matters (their
infertilityandchildbearingplans) andtoundergocounsel-
ing about those matters. Many women would find this
invasion ofprivacy sufficiently offensive to induce them to
drop their efforts to apply for employment. Similarly, the
requirement for yearly counseling of women who have
elected lead jobs against the advice of the company's
physician is potentially harassing and interferes with
decisions that are more appropriately made bythe women
themselves. Women, but not men, are singled out for
constantpressure from theemployer tofind otheremploy-
ment or to transfer to otherjobs.
Moreover,thecompany'srequirementthatwomensigna
formaldocument,purportingtoshifttothem"responsibil-
ity"foranyharmthatmightoccur, is extremelyintimidat-
ing. Again, its primary purpose is to discourage
employment. If the employer merely wanted proof that
employees had been fully and adequately warned about
occupational hazards, a simple form signed by the
employees acknowledging that they had been given such
instruction would be sufficient. Theintimidating nature of
the form is obviously designed, not to document the
employer's provision ofeducational materials andwarning
of hazardous employment, but to further discourage
women from pursuing employment. Also, the warning is
biased and misleading because it contains an extreme
statementofthefetalrisk-implying permanent"damage
to the brain" in every child born to a woman whose blood
lead levels exceed what is normally found in the home-
while wholly omitting any mention of the reproductive
risks faced bymaleworkers, arisk OSHAhas found to be
significant (26). Finally, it is only necessary to provide
different warnings to women if the employer fails to
maintain a work environment that is equally safe for
women and men. Title VII requires employers to offer
womenequalaccesstojobsandequaltermsandconditions
of employment, arguably including equally safe working
conditions, unless it is impossible or infeasible to do so.
This does not mean that the employer may not warn
workers oftherisks ofemploymentthatcannotfeasiblybe
reduced on eliminated. Indeed, employers must provide
such health information to workers, buttheymust do so in
awaythatdoesnotconstitutediscrimination.Ataminimum,
this means that any information must fully, fairly, and
accuratelydescribe the risks to both males and females and
thattheinformationmustnotbepresentedwiththepurpose
or effect ofdiscouraging or harassingwomen.
The "informed consent" concept used in the medical
context provides a useful model and a well-developed
standard for judging the sufficiency of warnings. This
modelrequires medical careproviders toprovideinforma-
tion aboutalternatives to aparticular course oftreatment,
for example. In the employment context, this would sug-
gest, among other things, that individuals working in the
lead industry, to be deemed to have knowingly acquiesced
toirreduciblerisksthatareinherentinthemanufacturing
process,mustbeinformedthattheyhavearighttorequest
medical removal in certain circumstances (e.g., to safe-
guard reproductive function, ifblood leads exceed 30 pLg/
dL, or ifrecommended by a physician).
Disabilitylawalso suggestsprinciplesthatshouldapply
in situations in which workers face irreducible risks to
reproductive well being. Employers are required to make
reasonable accommodations to permit an otherwise
qualified,butdisabled,individual towork (33).This obliga-
tionis limited onlyifanemployer shows thataccommodat-
ing the worker would be an "undue hardship." The same
standard should apply where necessary to accommodate
pregnant workers or males facing an unacceptable level of
reproductive risk. Ifan accommodation is available without
undue hardship to the employer and a similar benefit has
been provided to disabled employees, the refusal to extend
this benefit to individuals threatened with reproductive
injury,ifaninjuryresults,oughttobeconstruedas agrossly
negligent, willful, or intentionally tortious act.
In summary, thesecompanies suggestthattheirobliga-
tions towomenunder TitleVII ofthe Civil RightsAct are
satisfied ifthey simply allow women to apply for work or
jobtransfers, eventhoughtheythendiscouragethemfrom
takingthejobs. This is notunlike a companyarguing that
ithas satisfieditsobligation tominoritiesbyofferingthem
employment, while at the same time cautioning that they
will find their co-workers biased and that they can there-
fore expect unpleasant working conditions. It is the
employer's duty to make sure that such behavior does not
occur (34). Any other result would frustrate the purposes
of Title VII. Similarly, in the case of occupational health
hazards, itistheemployer'sresponsibilitytotakethe kind
of action necessary to remove the hazard from the work-
place. Itisnotenoughtosimplycautionwomenandtohope
that, as a result ofthe caution, fertile women will not seek
employment. That approach violates Title VII ofthe Civil
Rights Act. It also violates the employer's responsibilities
under the OSH Act.
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Eliminating Reproductive and
Developmental Health Risks in the
Workplace
The entry of large numbers of fertile women into the
workplace and the increasing evidence of reproductive
risks faced by both the male and female workers should
cause the government and employers to focus more
directly on reproductive and developmental health risks
and tomove much moreaggressivelyinprotectingagainst
such risks.
Voluntary Action. The most effective strategy for
reducing reproductive and developmental health risks in
the workplace would be a voluntary effort by employers.
Entry of fertile women into jobs once closed to them
because of fetal protection policies ought to induce
employers to give their immediate attention to the
reproductive and developmental health risks that admit-
tedlyexistinsuchworkenvironments.Previously,theyhad
little incentive to remove or mitigate these risks because
male employees generally could not recover for any inju-
ries to their reproductive or sexual function (unless those
injuries also resulted in a work disability). At most,
employers paid any medical cost for treating such condi-
tions.
Nonetheless, inthemonthsfollowing UAWversusJohn-
son Controls, there has been no evidence of any major
employer initiative in this area. Of course, there have
always been some employers who have routinely and his-
torically addressed reproductive and developmental
healthrisks.The DowChemicalCompanywouldappearto
be in this category. One ofits medical experts, K. S. Rao,
wrote in 1981 that it was the policy ofthe Dow Chemical
Company to protect all employees, male and female, from
anyoverexposuretoanychemical; thatitspolicywastoset
anexposure levelthatprotects "thepopulation mostsensi-
tive to the toxic effects ofa certain chemical"; and that it
"maintain[ed] chemical exposure levels sufficiently low to
allow for the acceptable employment of women of child-
bearing potential without harm" (35). Following UAW
versusJohnson Controls, this health policyshould become
standardthroughoutindustry, sincetheOSHActrequires
that employers remove any "recognized hazard" of
employment, andTitleVIIprohibitstheexclusionoffertile
orpregnantwomen,eveninsituationswheretheymightbe
the most sensitive population. Thus, while the Supreme
Courtdid notdecide anyoftheunderlyinghealth issues in
UAWversus Johnson Controls, it did assume a degree of
employerresponsibility. Asthe Court noted (1, sect. 1209):
"Johnson Controls attempts to solve the problem of
reproductive health hazards by resorting to an exclu-
sionary policy. Title VII plainly forbids illegal sex dis-
crimination as a method of diverting attention from an
employer's obligation to police the workplace." The
Court's assumption seems clear: employers should
removethehazard, notthewomen. Butwhataboutthose
companies that ignore this new mandate? Is there any-
thing that can be done legally to compel the necessary
workplace modifications?
The Need for OSHA Enforcement Action. As noted
earlier, Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act imposes a general duty on each employer to
furnish a "place ofemployment" that is "free from recog-
nized hazards that are likely to cause ... serious physical
harm tohisemployees." Underthe caselaw, the Secretary
ofLabor,inordertomakeoutaSection5(a)(1) charge,has
toshowa)seriousphysicalharmtotheemployee, b)froma
recognized risk, c) that was preventable. The term
"serious physical harm" includes any impairment of the
employee's reproductive orsexual function. The Guides to
theEvaluation ofPermanent Impairment (36), issued by
the American Medical Association, includes as a medical
impairment the loss of the employee's reproductive and
sexual function, including the loss of a man's ability to
father children. Similarly, ifawoman is infertile, suffers a
miscarriage or a stillbirth, or gives birth to a child with
birth defects because ofworkplace exposures, she herself
has suffered a "serious physical harm" because of the
impairmentofherreproductive capacity. Thefactthatthe
childmayalso havesuffered "seriousphysical harm" in no
way negates the harm to the mother's reproductive func-
tion.
With respect to the second requirement, it seems clear
that any company that previously had a fetal protection
policyorthatnowwarnsitsemployeesofreproductive and
developmental risks and/or asks its employees to sign a
waiver acknowledging that they have been warned about
the risk and "accept responsibility" for such risk, has
"recognized" a"hazardofemployment" asthosetermsare
used in Section 5(a)(1) ofthe Act.
Once the employer has (or should have) recognized the
hazard, the employer cannot, as the waiverwould attempt
to do, shift the burden of the hazard back onto the
employee by giving the employee the option of either
continuing toworkunderthe hazardous condition or quit-
tingandlookingforworkelsewhere. Thewholepurpose of
theActistorequirethatanemployerwhoseworkplacehas
a recognized hazard affirmatively investigate measures
for preventing that hazard. While the OSH Act does not
impose a duty of absolute safety, it does require the
elimination of any significant and preventable hazards.
And while the courts have found that Congress did not
intend toprotectemployeesbyputtingtheiremployers out
ofbusiness "eitherbyrequiringprotection ... unavailable
underexistingtechnology orbymakingfinancialviability
generally impossible" (37), it is no defense to a general
duty clause violation that the abatement or mitigation of
the hazard would be difficult or expensive (38).
There are several immediate enforcement actions that
the Department ofLabor should take in the aftermath of
UAWversus Johnson Controls. First, OSHA should send
out a general communication to all employers advising
them that, if they had a fetal protection policy prior to
UAW versus Johnson Controls, or if they are currently
requiringanyoftheiremployees to sign awaiveracknowl-
edging a risk and accepting responsibility for that risk,
and have not taken any affirmative steps to remove or
mitigate the asserted risk, they would appear to be vio-
lating Section 5(a)(1). The kinds of affirmative steps that
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employers should considerwould include engineering con-
trols, toxic use reduction, and various personnel practices.
These practices could include gender-neutral health edu-
cation, as well as voluntary removal and transfer pro-
grams, provided thatthe latter measures were temporary
(untilriskreduction couldbe completed) and included rate
and benefit protection.
Second, OSHA should at least issue a public statement
clarifying that the waivers being solicited by employers
arevoid andunenforceable as contrarytopublicpolicyand
do not satisfy the employer's obligations under Section
5(a)(1) to take affirmative steps to remove the recognized
hazard or, where that is not technologically or eco-
nomically feasible, to institute other methods for mitigat-
ing the hazard. Third, the Department of Labor should
schedule special inspections of industries that routinely
used fetal protection policies and/or ofthe companies that
were known to have used such policies to determine
whether their conduct after UAW versus Johnson Con-
trols complies with the requirements ofthe Act.
The Department's failure to take any of these actions
has resulted in all too much business as usual. For exam-
ple, the Exide Corporation (which had a fetal protection
policy) issuedwritten instructions to its personnel on how
to deal with claims for workplace protection following
UAW versus Johnson Controls. According to this advice,
employers are "not required to provide medical removal
protection (MRP) in cases where an employee ... is
removed at his or her request because of a concern about
the effects of lead exposure on his or her reproductive
health or the health of a fetus. Since pregnant women
cannot be excluded from lead-exposed positions by Com-
panyPhysician, the womanwould notbeeligible forMRP"
(39).
This advice contains atleasttwo significant errors. a) It
misstates the employer's obligation under the Lead Stan-
dard. Section 1910.1025(k)(1)(ii) ofthe Lead Standard (26)
explicitly requires that employers initiate MRP for any
employeewhere a"finalmedical determination results in a
medical ... opinion that the employee has a detected
medical condition [e.g., pregnancy] which places the
employee at increased risk of material impairment to
health from exposure to lead." While employees have a
right to demand a multiple physician review, either in
seeking such a determination or in challenging such a
determination, a company whose physician has strongly
recommendedthatfertile womennotworkinjobsresulting
in blood lead levels in excess of 10 ,ug/100 g cannot now
determinethat apregnant womanisat noincreasedriskof
material impairment. Moreover, Appendix A to the Lead
Standard specificallyrecommends that MRPbetriggered
for men and women who wish to bear children whenever
their blood leads reach a level of 30 ,ug/100 g (26).
b)Withoutregard to anystandard, Section5(a)(1) ofthe
OSH Act (7) requires employers tb remove recognized
hazards insofar as feasible. Having"recognized" a signifi-
cant risk to fertile and pregnant women at blood levels
above 10 pg/100 g, the employer has a duty to initiate all
feasible methods for reducing or eliminating this recog-
nized hazard. Since MRP is certainly feasible in this
industry (particularly given the low birth rate for indus-
trial workers), the employer could be required to imple-
ment mechanisms like MRP even in the absence of a
standard and at levels of exposure below those recom-
mended in the standard.
There is other documentary evidence that companies
are violating the Lead Standard in their response to the
UAW versus Johnson Controls decision. For example,
Exide has prepared "educational" materials to "assist
individuals in making an informed judgment regarding
their decision to work in a lead environment." These
materials represent "that it is unlikely adult males and
females with blood-lead levels below [50 ,ug/100 g] will
experience any significant adverse effects on their
reproductive health" (39). This statement misrepresents
OSHA's findings, reported in Appendix A of the Lead
Standard, that there are reproductive risks to both males
andfemales atbloodleadsof30 pug/100g. Italsomisrepre-
sents the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) con-
clusionsaboutthecardiovascularriskstoadultmenfroma
10 ,ug/100 g level exposure, which formed the basis for
EPA's decision to ban lead in gasoline. Indeed, menwith a
personal or family history of cardiovascular disease
should be specifically warned about this significant risk.
Another company's educational materials state, with
respect to the risk of lead exposure on adult health, that
"the use oflead in our manufacturing operation creates a
lead absorption risk for employees" (40). There is no
further explanation ofwhat this risk is. Such a statement
seriouslyunderstates therisks associatedwithlead expo-
sure and does not comply with the Lead Standard's
requirement that employers "inform employees of the
content ofappendices A and B ofthis regulation" (26).
Thematerialsgo onto statethat"awoman ...cancause
damage to the brain of her unborn child if she works
aroundleadwithleadlevelshigherthanthoseinherhome.
The company strongly recommends that women of child-
bearing capability not seek jobs where they will have to
work with lead materials. Blood lead levels as low as 10
,ug/100 mL have been shown to cause decreased intel-
ligence resulting in retarded learning, slower coordina-
tion, and serious behavioral problems. Any brain damage
tothebabyprobablywill bepermanent" (40). Inlightofits
warnings to men, this statement seems intentionally
designed to mislead men and shift the burden to insure
fetal safety to women by inducing them to forego work,
again relieving the employer ofthe obligation to clean up.
Moreover,theemployerviolatestheexplicitrequirement
ofthe Lead Standard that any training program "include
information concerning the adverse health effects associ-
ated with excessive exposure to lead (with particular
attentiontotheadversereproductiveeffects onbothmales
and females)" (26). The need for nondiscriminatory train-
ing was further emphasized in the preamble to the rule
(20). As stated there:
... Duringthehearings,therewasconsiderabletestimonyon
the need to inform workers, both male and female, of the
severe effects on the reproductive system from exposure to
lead ... Forexample,Andrea Hricko stated: "Employees and
job applicants must be informed that excessive exposures to
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lead have resulted in reproductive difficulties, including fer-
tility problems, menstrual disorders, stillbirths, miscar-
riages and other hazardous effects so that they understand
the significance ofblood, sperm, and pregnancy testing" ...
OSHAis in complete agreementwith thisviewand therefore
will require the employer to develop an education program
which addresses the danger of exposure to lead on the
reproductive system, and on employee options as part ofthe
medical surveillance program, e.g., fertility and pregnancy
testing. OSHA believes this is a crucial provision of the
standard. A worker, whether male or female, who is fully
informed ofthehazardsofleadwillbebetterabletoavoidthe
adverse reproductive effects documented in the preamble.
The knowledge ofthe hazard in this instance is crucial since
there is concern that workers whose blood leads do not
exceed the 30 p.g/100 g level may still be at risk especially if
they have extended tenure in a lead industry.
Finally, anondiscriminatorypolicyshould containinfor-
mation on all significant and equivalent health risks, and
notjust reproductive risks. While employers may commu-
nicate the opinions of their own medical advisers, they
mustbe clearlylabeled as such. Theycannot communicate
onlythatinformation, and notthe otherscientificinforma-
tion, including different opinions and especially conclu-
sions reached by Federal regulators in establishing
appropriate levels of protection against other significant
and equivalent adult risks.
What can labor and civil rights groups do ifOSHAfails
totake anyofthesimple steps outlined above? Theoptions
are limited but not nonexistent. As mentioned earlier, the
OSH Act does not give employees the authority to bring
their own law suit against an employer who has failed to
comply with Section 5(a)(1) ofthe Act orwith any specific
standard promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. How-
ever, it might be possible to bring a law suit against the
Secretary of Labor to obtain a court order directing the
Department to enforce the law, especially against
employers who violate specific provisions of standards,
such as by failing to inform men that lead is a male
reproductive toxicant, or by failing to provide MRP bene-
fits to pregnant women with excessive blood lead levels.
Unfortunately, an agency's refusal to take any specific
enforcement action is generally considered an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and one that the courts will not
review (41). There are some limited exceptions to this rule
if the agency's refusal to initiate enforcement action is
based on a misunderstanding of the law or if its actions
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities
(42,43).
This raises the additional question of whether legisla-
tion to improve workplace safety, such as the Comprehen-
sive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act of 1991,
introduced by Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum as
S.1622, should be amended to provide for private enforce-
ment ofthe law. While giving a Federal agency the exclu-
siverightto suehelpscontrolthe caseload,there areother
ways to eliminate frivolous suits. Restricting who can
enforce the lawmakes employees' safety and health rights
subjecttothecapacities andproclivities ofanunderstaffed
and (sometimes) politicized government agency. Apart
from this concern, there is every reason to allow both
employees and the agencytobringlawsuits to enforce the
protections ofthe OSHAct.* It seems anomalous to allow
private suits to protect the rights ofemployees to wages,
pensions, benefits, and nondiscrimination, but not the
rightsofemployeestoasafeandhealthyworkplace.Tothe
extent that employee suits might raise complex questions
of abatement or preventability, the three commissioners
appointed to the OSHRC who hear these cases are
selected for their expertise in the area (7). Moreover, the
Department of Labor can always intervene as a party in
appropriate cases or file an amicus brief presenting its
views.
A final strategy for forcing OSHA to respond more
aggressively to enforce reproductive and developmental
health in the workplace would be to ask the appropriate
Senate or House Subcommittees to conduct hearings.
These hearings could prove valuable in determining just
how many companies had fetal protection policies and
whatkindsofactionhavebeentakensincethe UAWversus
Johnson Controls decision to remove or mitigate the haz-
ards to reproductive and developmental health.
EffectofWaivers. Ithasbeen afairlycommon practice
after UAW versus Johnson Controls for companies to
require that women previously covered by a fetal protec-
tionpolicysign a so-called waiver, similar to the following:
The law requires that you be given the option of choosing
whether or not to accept a job for which you are otherwise
qualified, even ifitmay involve significant lead exposure and
risk to your future children. The Company strongly and
emphaticallyrecommends thatyou not accept placementin a
job where the blood lead level may exceed 10 ,ug/100 mL. I
understand and accept responsibility for these risks which
have been explained to me by the nurse and examining
physician for this plant. I have been encouraged to discuss
these risks with my family and personal physician before
accepting any such position (40).
These waivers are different from a simple acknowledg-
ment that the employee has attended a training or educa-
tional meeting on reproductive and developmental health
risks. Inadditiontodiscouragingwomenfromtakingsuch
jobs, they attempt to relieve the employers oftheir obliga-
tions under both the OSH Act and tort law.
Such waiver language is void and unenforceable as
contrary to public policy (44-47). As a result, it does not
exempt the employer from any tortliabilityfor anyinjury
or harm caused by its negligence, nor does it constitute a
defense to a Section 5(a)(1) OSH Act violation.
The real harm in the waivers is that employees, having
signedthem, oftenbelieve thatthe employerdoes nothave
anyfurther responsibility under the law. As a result, they
do not reportunhealthyworking conditions to their union
representatives or to the properauthorities, and theymay
fail to assert other legal rights. Certainly, in any case
where an employee is fired for refusing to sign a waiver,
*Safety and health disputes are not like disputes arising under the
National Labor Relations Act and the Landrum Griffin Act, where
employeesuitsarealsobanned. Inthosecases,there areimportantpolicy
considerations thatsupportthecurtailment ofprivate litigation so as not
to delay collective bargaining or discourage the resolution of disputes
through grievance mechanisms. OSHA enforcement presents no such
concerns.
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the discharge should be challenged in state court under
the wrongful discharge doctrine (48). Moreover, it may
also be possible to obtain a declaratoryjudgment from a
state court declaring that these waivers are void and
unenforceable because they are contrary to public policy.
Standard Setting. The Department of Labor, in addi-
tion to its enforcement role, has the responsibility for
promulgating safety and health standards to protect
employees in the work force. Under Section 6(b)(5) ofthe
OSH Act, the Secretary of Labor, in setting standards
dealing with toxic substances, "shall set the standard
which most adequately assures ... that no employee will
suffer amaterialimpairmentofhealth orfunctional capac-
ity" (26). Both the Secretary of Labor and the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have interpreted this lan-
guage as requiring the Secretary to include in its signifi-
cantrisk analysis allworkers, including thosewho are the
most susceptible. For example, Building and Construc-
tion Thades Department versus Secretary ofLabor (49)
held that OSHA, in performing its asbestos risk assess-
ment, correctlyincluded smokers and correctly assumed a
45-yearwork life (even though mostworkers in the indus-
try are there for less than 5years). Also, inAuto Workers
versusOSHA (50),theCourtheldthatOSHA,inassessing
the risk of dermal effects of exposure to formaldehyde,
properly considered the effects of formaldehyde on "sen-
sitized workers" who make up 20-30% of the population.
It is true that, in performing the second step of its
standard analysis (viz., setting the lowest feasible level
when the safe level is not feasible), OSHA has previously
mandated special treatment for workers with higher risk
propensities (such as persons who are unable to wear
respirators). However, OSHA concedes that such distinc-
tions cannot be based on sex, fertility, or pregnancy any
more than they can be based on race (Secretary Scannell,
October 6, 1991, personal communication). That view is
consistentwith the normal rules ofstatutory construction
requiring that a Federal statute should notbe interpreted
inanywaythatwouldbeinconsistentwiththemandates of
another Federal statute (in this case, Title VII and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978) unless no other
interpretation were possible.
In promulgating standards under Section 6(b)(5),
OSHA has regularly set standards at a level designed to
protect both reproductive and developmental health (e.g.,
the Lead Standard). However, the standard-setting pro-
cess has been slow, and there are a number ofsubstances
and processes that present reproductive and developmen-
tal health risks that have not been the subject of any
regulatory action. Where a standard is in effect, Section
5(a)(2) ofthe Act requires employers to comply with that
standard. But where there is no standard, the employer's
only obligation is to eliminate recognized risks.
There are two problems with the standard-setting pro-
cess. One is the time required to promulgate a final
standard. The other is the inability ofOSHA to regularly
update existing standards with the addition of new infor-
mation. As a result, some of the existing standards are
inadequate when measured against more current medical
and scientific findings.
MORE STANDARDS NEED TO BE ISSUED. According to
the1991reportprepared bythe GeneralAccountingOffice
(GAO), OSHAhas notregulated 9 ofthe 30 chemicals that
GAO has identified as having significant adverse
reproductive and developmental effects (51). Obviously
adequate protection of reproductive and developmental
health requires additional regulatory action.
WHENSTANDARDSARE OUT OF DATE ORKNOWN TO BE
INADEQUATE. Although standards generally provide
employers with greater notice of their duties under the
OSH Act than the generally worded requirement of Sec-
tion 5(a)(1), the Court ofAppeals for the D.C. Circuit has
recognized that there could be circumstances where an
employer, even though in compliance with an applicable
standard, would still be in violation of Section 5(a)(1) ifit
knew that the conditions at its place of employment were
such thatthe standardwould notadequately dealwiththe
hazards to which its employees were exposed (52). The
Court's holding is based on the premise that the Depart-
ment has no authority to trump Congress's explicit man-
date under Section 5(a)(1). Under that premise, it would
follow that, even if the standard dealt with the specific
health issue (i.e., a safe level of exposure), the employer
could not rely on the standard for a safe harbor if the
employer knew that the level of exposure specified in the
standardwasnolongeradequatetoprotectagainstrecog-
nized risks and ifthe unacceptable level ofrisk exposure
was preventable.
Accommodating Workers at Risk
Because itwill not always be possible to provide awork
environment that does not present significant risks to
reproductive and developmental health, an importantpart
of any comprehensive health and safety program is the
provision of temporary job transfers and/or disability
leaves when the employee cannot safelywork in his or her
usualjobforaperiodoftime.Theneedforsuch aprogram
can often arise when a woman becomes pregnant, when a
man experiences sexual dysfunction or has sperm abnor-
malities, or when other symptoms reveal that an occupa-
tional hazard to reproduction requires temporary job
modification. TheLead Standard,withitsprovisionforthe
temporary removal of both men and women from lead-
exposedjobswhere their doctors have recommended such
action, is an important example of how these health con-
cerns should be met.
Unfortunately, OSHA has not always vigorously
enforced these medical removal protections. Unions and
employees should reportviolations ofthe Lead Standard's
MRP provisions to OSHA and request enforcement. The
union might also initiate agrievance or aTitleVII charge.
For example, in UAWversus Johnson Controls, one ofthe
individual plaintiffs was a male employee who complained
that the company had denied his request for a 3-month
leave ofabsence, which he had requested "for the purpose
of lowering his blood lead level to enable him to father a
child," under circumstances which constituted a violation
of Title VII because a similar request would have been
granted to afertile female (53). Butwhat kind ofreliefcan
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male and female employees expect in the absence of an
OSHA standard?
There are currentlyfive states (California, Hawaii, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island; Puerto Rico also has a
temporary disability insurance program) that provide
short-term partial wage replacement protection for
workerswho areunable (because ofadisabilityorphysical
or medical condition) to perform their regular or custom-
ary work. Most of these statutes provide benefits for a
period of26 weeks. It is important to establish, in each of
these states, that the conditions described above qualify
for disability income protection. (Income replacement is
only required where the employer cannot find work that
the employee is able toperformfortheperiod ofhis orher
disability.)
Since UAW versus Johnson Controls, there have been
reports that some employers have refused disability to
pregnantwomen onthegroundsthatthehealththreatisto
the unborn child and not to the physical health of the
mother. This response, while predictable, is not consistent
withlegalprinciples. Reproduction is one ofanindividual's
most basic body functions. Any condition that interferes
with the individual's ability to reproduce or impairs the
health of the fetus and future child (e.g., infertility or a
tendency toward miscarriages, stillbirths, or birth
defects) is a "physical condition" for purposes ofthe state
disability laws if it prevents the employee from safely
workingin his orherusualjob. Iftheemployercannotfind
a temporarytransfer, the condition becomes a"disability."
One case directly in point is Pond versus Oliver (54). In
that case, a woman employee was told by her doctor that
she should notremain in anywork environment containing
paint fumes while she was pregnantbecause ofapotential
hazard to the fetus. She quit when the employer was
unable to provide her with a place of employment free of
paint fumes. The court held that her separation from
employment "was clearly not voluntary but occasioned by
illness," that she was thus "disabled" in connection with
her pregnancy, and that she was entitled to disability
benefits.
In amore recent California case, the administrative law
judge ruled that a pregnant woman qualified for state
disability insurance benefits when her physician recom-
mended almostcompletebedrest(makingitimpossiblefor
hertogotowork) inanefforttoencouragefetalgrowth. In
concludingthatthewoman's conditionwas"disabling," the
judge noted that "maternal health cannot be separated
from the health of the fetus," and that it "would be
unreasonable to expect the claimant to make a choice
between the health of her baby and loss of her disability
benefits" (55).
It seems clear from the typical language used in the
state disability statutes, in short-term disability benefit
plans provided byprivate employers, and in the unemploy-
mentinsurance laws, thatmedical conditionsrelatingto an
employee's ability to conceive and give birth to a healthy
child are medical conditions eligible for "disability" or
unemployment insurance benefits in those situations
where the employer cannot or will not offer suitable alter-
native employment for the duration of the disability.
Admittedly, each of the 50 state unemployment statutes
treat employees who "voluntarily leave work" somewhat
differently.All statesrecognize thatapersonwho quitsfor
good cause is involuntarily unemployed. Some states
require that a good cause "be connected to the work" or
"attributable to the employer." Others include as "good
cause" purely personal reasons such as relocation of a
spouse to another jurisdiction. Whatever the state, a
woman who quits because the work is hazardous to her
healthortothatofherfetus hasleftworkfor"good cause"
connectedtotheworkor"attributable totheemployer."As
a result, she would qualify for unemployment compensa-
tion, atleastsolongas sheremainsableandavailableto do
other work (56).
The employer's refusal or inability to find such work
may or may notviolate either Title VII ofthe Civil Rights
Act or the employer's "general duty clause" obligation
under the OSH Act. A Title VII violation would occur if
accommodations were made for other kinds ofdisabilities
and ifthe refusal to accommodate for disabilities relating
to reproduction were directed only at pregnant women or
disproportionately affected women.
Whateverlaws the employermayhaveviolated in refus-
ing to accommodate the employee's medical condition
relating to reproductive and developmental health, the
existence ofthe medical condition triggers the protections
of the various disability and unemployment insurance
laws. Accordingly, it is important for employees to under-
stand what rights they have to job retention and partial
income replacement, and how to enforce those rights by
filing claims under the benefit plan or under the state
disability law (in the five states that have them) and/or
under state unemployment insurance law. If the admin-
istratoroftheprivatedisabilityplanimproperlydeniesthe
claimontheground thataphysician's concernforthefetus
and/orforahealthypregnancyoutcomeis notaphysical or
medical condition, Section 502(a)(1) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act allows the employee to
file suit "to recover benefits due ... under the terms ofan
employee benefit plan" (57). The trial court, in reviewing
the denial of the claim, will typically interpret the lan-
guage ofthe plan undergeneral principles ofcontractlaw,
which means that any ambiguity in the language of the
planwill be construedinfavoroftheplanbeneficiary, or, in
this case, the worker.
For those employees who work in a state without a
disability law and for an employer who does not provide
private plan disability benefits, there are fewer choices
when the employer refuses to make the necessary accom-
modation in work assignment or is unable to do so. How-
ever, if the employee decides to quit and apply for
unemployment insurance benefits while seeking other
employment that does not present the same medical risks,
he or she would be eligible for such benefits, since the quit
would notbe deemedtohavebeenvoluntarybecauseitwas
necessitated by the employee's medical needs.
Finally, even if the employer does not make available
other work that the employee can do, the employee or the
employee's union maybe able to work out an arrangement
forleave without pay. This option mightbe more desirable
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than unemployment insurance ifimmediate income is not
the problem and if the employer is willing to retain the
employee'sjob. This model has been adopted bythe three
states that have enacted a family and medical leave law
that includes some protection forthe employee who needs
leave because ofhis or her own "serious illness" or serious
medical condition" (58). Underthese laws, the employee is
allowed from 2 to 16 weeks ofunpaid leave during which
time the employee receives job retention rights and con-
tinuedmedicalbenefits. Because somanystates, aswellas
Congress, are currently considering the adoption ofsimi-
lar statutes, it would seem that the issue ofreproductive
and developmental health shouldbemore carefullyconsid-
ered in drafting these laws. Obviously, one problem with
the current statutes is the very short period ofprotection
(which in Wisconsin is only 2 weeks). Second, it is not
entirely clear that the term "serious health condition" or
"serious illness" includes physical conditions related to
reproductive and developmental health. The Wisconsin
statute defines a"serioushealth condition" as a"disabling
illness, injuryorcondition involving: (a) inpatient care in a
hospital, nursing home, or hospice, or (b) outpatient care
that requires continuing treatment or supervision by a
health care provider" (58) It may be that some different
language should be used to cover the problem ofleaves in
aid ofreproductive and developmental health.
Even without such laws, there is nothing to prevent
unions and employees (where there is no union) from
attempting to obtain the employer's agreement to permit
employees to take a voluntary leave without pay to pro-
mote the employee's reproductive and developmental
health. Of course, any state law or collectively bargained
agreement that provides only partial wage replacement
for employees temporarily disabled because ofpregnancy
or other reproductive conditions, or worse, unpaid leave,
while of some help, is hardly the optimal solution for
accommodating the employee's reproductive health needs.
Compensating Employees and Their
Children for Injury
The entitlement to monetary recovery when employer
negligence results in reproductive injury seems self-
evident. Moreover, the need for such a remedy in such
cases is often urgent because many injuries are not cur-
rently compensable and the workers most likely to con-
front reproductive risk at work may lack financial
resources to cope with such injuries, especially if the
injury results in infertility or the birth of a child with
special medical needs.
The limitations of the workers' compensation system
with regard to reproductive risk have already been men-
tioned. Briefly,work-related injuries to adultreproductive
health orfunction aregenerallycompensable onlythrough
workers' compensation and are thus subject to the limited
remedies available in that system. Generally, suchinjuries
are not compensable at all, because they are not covered
underworkers' compensation [for example, ifthey are not
workdisabling(59)]. Resorttotheciviltortlawremediesis
nonetheless precluded by the workers' compensation
"exclusive remedy" doctrine. In such situations, injured
workers may have no remedy to compensate for injuries
even when employer negligence is present.
In some states, workers who have been injured as a
result of gross negligence or intentionally wrongful acts
may be able to bypass workers' compensation and seek a
remedyin tortlaw, but such cases are unusual and maybe
difficulttowinbecause oftheneedtoprovetheintentional
or egregious nature of the employer's conduct (60,61).
Better remedies are thus plainly needed to compensate
adultworkers, especiallyforreproductiveinjuries thatare
not work-disabling but that can be traced directly to the
occupational setting.
As ageneral rule, ithasbeen assumed thatthe children
of workers are not bound by the workers' compensation
system for any injuries that they may suffer due to
employer negligence to the parent (62,63). As a result, it
has been assumed that such a child could sue the parent's
employerunderanyapplicabletortlawtheory(negligence,
intentional tort, strict liability). Such cases have been
brought, more often by the children who assert paternal
occupational exposure to mutagens prior to conception
(17); there is at least one reported case alleging injury
from prenatal exposure to lead (64).
These cases have met with limited success, largely
because of the difficulty of proving cause and effect and
employer negligence and because of the successful inter-
position ofvarioustechnical defenses. Someplaintiffs have
undoubtedlyreceived monetary settlements, butthese are
rarely reported on any official legal form and are often
difficult to trace orconfirm. The reported decisions reveal
that, even where tort remedies are available, the limita-
tions of the tort law system-requiring that plaintiffs
commence suit within a limited time period (sometimes
foreclosing suit for injuries that are not immediately or
easily apparent) and that they prove causation and
negligence-render them of limited utility in redressing
injuries. It is thus unclear to what extent the tort law
system deters employer negligence regarding occupa-
tionalreproductiverisks.Plainly,thethreatoftortliability
has some deterrent effect on employers but that effect
couldbevastlyenhanced iflegalrequirementswerebetter
tailored to accommodate this type ofinjury.
Whatever corrective value access to the tort law pro-
vides has been eliminated in California by a recent court
decision essentially exempting employers in that state
from liability for negligence to a pregnant woman result-
inginharmtothefetusandlater-bornchild.Thiscase, and
others that reached a different conclusion, illustrate the
thorny dilemmafacingcourts andlegislaturesintryingto
create a meaningful remedy for reproductive injury that
results in harm to a fetus or child.
The California case, Bell versus Macy's, Inc. (28),
involved a pregnant female employee who suffered a rup-
tured uterus atwork. Her conditionwas notrecognizedby
the employer's medical personnel, who delayed in calling
an ambulance. As aresult, the fetuswas harmed andborn
with serious disabilities, and later died as a result of his
prenatal injuries. A tort action based on employer negli-
gence in failing to provide emergency medical assistance
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promptly,which might have avoided thefetal injuries,was
rejected by an intermediate appellate court.
While various options were available to the court to
permit recovery, the court held that workers' compensa-
tion was the mother's exclusive remedy, meaning that it
washeronlybasis forrecovery. Since thefetus hadbeen a
part ofthe mother's body at the time ofinjury, the Court
reasoned that workers' compensation should provide the
exclusive remedy for the child's prenatal injuries as well.
Thecourtrecognizedthat,becauseworkers' compensation
provided no remedy for this injury, the child's prenatal
injuries would not be compensated at all.
The court noted, but did not rely on, cases in which
employers had excluded fertile women from employment,
or required them to be sterilized, and observed that any
result other than the one reached would have encouraged
employers to bar fertile women from employment. While
this concern for women's employment opportunities is
laudable, the court's observation and decision deserve
criticism on several points. First, while it is true that if
employers have additional obligations to women workers,
there may be some inducement not to hire them, the tort
law experience indicates that employers may be equally
vulnerabletotheoffspringofmalesnegligentlyexposedto
toxicants. Since any decision permitting recovery by the
child ofaworkerwould also applyin casesinvolvingclaims
alleging paternal preconception injuries leading to fetal
and postnatal harm, the impact of the rule would not be
confined towomen. Indeed, the courtcould havemadethis
point clear in its opinion.
Second, the better result by far would be a rule that
discourages employer negligence and therefore averts
avoidable tragedies like the one that occurred inthis case.
The court's decision will have the opposite result by
exculpating employers who fail to observe an appropriate
duty of care and thereby cause predictable and avoidable
injury. Finally, the concern expressed by the court has
been better answered by the Supreme Court, which held
that an employerwho refuses to hire awoman, ostensibly
because of fear of liability for prenatal injuries, will be
liable for sex discrimination, a violation that will now
subject employers to liability for damages (21).
In UAWversus Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court,
unlike the California court, recognized the value in the
general rule thatemployers who knowingly ornegligently
cause fetal harm facepotential tortliability. The Supreme
Court's decision expressly recognizes that different legal
constraints operate together toinduce employers to actin
socially responsible ways, and the applicability oftort law
principles assures to some extent that women will not be
negligently orknowinglyexposed tofetalhazards atwork.
Evenifsomeemployerstryto shiftthisresponsibility onto
female workers or their doctors, these efforts can be
resisted, and tort remedies offer one option. Together, the
legal obligations imposed by tort law, antidiscrimination
law, and health and safetylaws logically require women to
be hired and employers to insure their safety.
The California court upset this balance, but its conclu-
sions and concerns merit attention, although for different
reasons thanthe courtstated, asevidencedbythe solution
reached by other courts. In Louisiana, for example, the
opposite resultwas reached, but the court based its deci-
sion to permit recoveryforwrongful death ofthe fetus on
state law providing that a fetus is a person from the
moment of conception (65). This doctrine is most often
invokedtorestrictwomen's access to abortion buthad the
ironic side effect here, and in other cases, of permitting
recovery in fetal injury cases. Thus, prosecutors around
the country have charged pregnant women with prenatal
childabuseandothercrimesforthe actoftakingdrugs or
drinking alcohol during pregnancy (66). Almost all of
these prosecutions rely on the theory that the fetus is
entitled to protection, under civil and criminal law, from
the wrongful acts of others that cause fetal harm. The
prosecutors in such cases assert that there is no distinc-
tioninthelawbetweensituationsinwhichanoutsideagent
inflicts injuryon apregnantwoman, causingfetal harmin
theprocess,andthoseinwhichthewomanherselfengages
in allegedly harmful conduct. The same principle creates
the potential thatwomen can be held liable in civil law for
damages (to later-born children or even to a spouse in
cases of fetal death) if they engage in negligent conduct
resulting in fetal injury or death. At least one court has
upheld therightofachild to sue hismotherfortakingthe
drug tetracycline during pregnancy, resulting in tooth
staining in the child (67).
These cases demonstrate how creating rights to com-
pensation forfetal injury,when the entitlement belongs to
the fetus or later-born child (as opposed to a right ofthe
parent to be free of injury that affects reproduction),
permits a personification of the fetus and creates prece-
dents that can be used to restrict and control the conduct
of pregnant women. While distinctions can surely be
drawn between the acts a woman does to herself and the
acts that are done to herbyanother, theprinciple thatthe
fetus has a right to recover for injuries makes it more
difficult logically to carve our exceptions based on who
inflicts theinjury. The creation oflegallycognizablerights
ofthefetusimplies acorrespondingdutyofcare, aconcept
that is most readily applied to the pregnant woman in
whosebodythefetusresides.Therighttorecoverforfetal
injury is thus a double-edged sword.
Efforts to create remedies forreproductive injurymust
navigate these shoalswith caution. GovernorPeterWilson
ofCalifornia proposed to remedy the problem created by
thedecisioninBellversusMacy'sbypermittingemployers
to bar pregnant women from hazardousjobs (68,69). This
proposal would be illegal as to employees covered byTitle
VII under UAW versus Johnson Controls, because state
law cannotundermine theprotections ofafederal statute.
It is also of questionable efficacy because it offers
employers no incentive to improve workplace conditions,
andbecauseitleavesunaddressedtheproblemsthatresult
frommaternalunemployment, such as povertyand loss of
health insurance.
Abetter approachwould be to remedythe inadequacies
in the workers' compensation system with regard to
reproductive injuries comprehensively and permit both
male and female workers to bring tort suits for reproduc-
tive injuries resulting from employer negligence. Suits by
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adults to compensate for the infliction of injury to
reproductivehealth orfunctioningcouldinclude aclaimfor
all consequential damages, including damages for the
effects of such injuries on a spouse, fetus, or child. While
this approach would begin to recognize the legitimate
needs ofworkers foran appropriate level ofprotection and
for remedies when the employer has not observed the
appropriate duty ofcare, even more far-reaching reforms
are needed to address the inapplicability of the tort law
system to this type of injury. New formulations of the
causation requirement, based on probabilistic projections
or other modifications, and revisions ofstatutes oflimita-
tions would go a long way toward checking negligent
conductinthis area andtowardprovidingcompensation to
needy and worthy victims ofemployer negligence.
Conclusion
It has not been the objective of this article to discuss
fully and in detail each ofthe several legal strategies that
will have to be developed and implemented to provide
working men and women and their families protection
from reproductive and developmental health hazards in
theworkplace. Manyoftherecommendations inthe article
are based on state law, including the general law oftorts,
wrongful discharge, unemployment insurance, and
workers' compensation. Because these laws very from
state to state, a more comprehensive discussion of the
recommended strategies would require a thorough anal-
ysis of laws in each state, their relative strengths, and a
careful evaluation of how most effectively to establish
useful precedent. Similarly, a more complete discussion of
the OSHAstrategieswould require an examination ofthat
agency's current resources and its commitment to health
issues, aswell as adetailed analysis oftheproposed OSHA
reform legislation.
In this paper, we sought to suggest an overall strategy
and guiding principles for workers and their representa-
tives, corporate directors, and policy makers who are
committed to the effort to achieve reproductive and devel-
opmental health in the workplace. We also wanted to flag
the basic legal rights at stake and to identify for workers
the kinds of steps that they will need to take to preserve
their rights. We hope that our comments will promote
more discussion ofthese issues in corporate headquarters
and that they will help stimulate a voluntary program for
workplace reform. In summary, this is intended to be the
beginning ofthe dialogue and discussion, not the end.
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